Abstract: This paper discusses the use of symbolic model checking technology to verify the design of an embedded satellite software control system called attitude and orbit control system (AOCS). This system is mission-critical because it is responsible for maintaining the attitude of the satellite and for performing fault detection, isolation, and recovery decisions of the satellite. An executable AOCS implementation by Space Systems Finland has been provided to us in Ada source code form. In order to use symbolic model checking methods, the Ada implementation of the system was modeled at a quite detailed implementation level using the input language of the symbolic model checker NuSMV 2. We describe the modeling techniques and abstractions used to alleviate the state explosion problem due to handling of timers and the large number of system components controlled by AOCS. The specification of the required system behavior was also provided to us in a form of extended state machine diagrams with prioritized transitions. These diagrams have been translated to a set of temporal logic properties, allowing the piecewise checking of the system behavior one extended state machine transition at a time. We also report on the scalability of symbolic model checking tools for the case study at hand as well as discuss potential topics for future work.
Introduction
Model checking [CGP99, BK08] is a technology where a formal model of a system's behavior is checked against its formal requirements often expressed in temporal logic. One of the main approaches in model checking is symbolic model checking using binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [BCM + 92] that is especially suitable for hardware designs. Symbolic model checking is also suitable for analyzing other systems with a high branching degree due to environment non-determinism. Bounded model checking (BMC) [BCCZ99] was invented to scale symbolic model checking to analyzing even larger systems, especially for finding bugs in hardware designs with a large number of state bits. The basic idea in bounded model checking is to look for counterexamples to the specified property that are shorter than a user specified maximum ECEASST model is very detailed and directly based on the Ada code implementation. Our motivation has been analyzing the correctness of the Ada implementation against its specifications, not to use refinement methodology to derive correct implementations. Thus our approach does not require significant changes in the software engineering methodology.
Attitude and Orbit Control System
The Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS) [Var10] is a generic component of satellite onboard software. It is mainly used to determine and control the attitude of the spacecraft while it is in orbit. Since there is disturbance from environment, if left uncontrolled, the spacecraft will change its orientation. Because of this, its attitude needs to be monitored and adjusted continuously. The information from various sensors provides the necessary input for the AOCS computation. Based on this, the actuators are used to preserve or change the attitude or orbit of the spacecraft.
In AOCS, different software functionalities are realized by corresponding managers. There are four managers, AOCS manager, FDIR manager, Mode manager and Unit manager, which are executed in sequence to fulfill various functionalities. The AOCS manager has as its main responsibility to compute the attitude control algorithm. The FDIR manager (Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery) is executed every time when new monitor data becomes available. There are three types of possible errors that are handled by the system: mode transition errors, attitude errors and unit errors. The Mode manager is in charge of mode transitions. In this AOCS implementation, there are six operational modes [Var10] listed below.
• Off. Normally, the spacecraft is in this mode after the system is booted.
• Standby. The system stays in this mode until separation from the launcher is completed.
• Safe. When the system is in this mode, it indicates that a stable attitude is obtained and the system endeavors to keep the coarse pointing control.
• Nominal. In this mode, the system is further trying to reach the fine pointing control.
• Preparation. The fine pointing control is reached and the unit Payload Instrument (PLI) is getting ready for the science mission.
• Science. The PLI is ready to carry out tasks. The overall goal is to stay in this mode as long as possible.
The normal mode transitions are shown in Figure 1 (a) as a state diagram. In Figure 1(b) , the bold arrows demonstrate the handling of mode transition errors in AOCS by the FDIR manager.
The Unit manager is used to manage unit resources, which encompasses avoiding conflicts in the usage of units and handling the units during their reconfiguration. There are in all seven different units: Earth Sensor (ES), Sun Sensor (SS), GPS, Star Tracker (STR), Reaction Wheel (RW), Thruster (THR) and Payload Instrument (PLI). The first four in this list are sensors, while RW and THR are actuators. The last unit, Payload Instrument, is a scientific measurement unit. In addition, there are two configurations, nominal and redundant, for each unit. Nominal unit configuration is the start setup where the unit begins its operation. All of the units also have a redundant backup copy. The redundant unit is used when the nominal unit fails. Both the nominal and redundant units have two possible configurations, on or off, in the available operational modes.
Modeling and Verifying of AOCS
We modeled the previously described AOCS system in the input language of the NuSMV 2 model checker [CCG + 02], starting from an Ada implementation. The system model is checked against a set of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) properties that are generated from a specification given as extended state machine diagrams with prioritized transitions. Below, Section 3.1 describes the general modeling of the system, and Section 3.2 shows how the LTL properties are generated from the specification. 
Modeling the AOCS System
The current implementation of AOCS system is written in Ada, and the system is modeled in NuSMV 2 at a level of detail that closely follows the Ada source code. The main aspects of modeling are described below.
Modeling the Units
There are in all seven units in the system as described in Section 2. Incorporating so many units in a single model is likely to cause state explosion [Val96] . Our current solution to cope with this problem is to construct a concrete model of only one unit, the PLI, and to introduce an abstraction of other units. Specifically, as only the error property of other units is mentioned in the LTL formula to be checked, the abstraction omits the other aspects of the units. Thus, the basic strategy is to introduce one Boolean variable representing the error property of each unit that non-deterministically obtains its truth value at each time point modeling the fact that any subset of other units can generate an error for the software to handle at any time. By these means, the state space of the model is controlled to a reasonable size. Figure 2 shows the data structures for modeling the PLI unit in the NuSMV 2 language. The module units accommodates the concretely modeled units. As discussed above, the PLI is currently the only unit fully modeled, but new units could be added to the variable list in this module as needed. The module unit t defines the basic properties of a unit. Here, the variable orig status records the status of the use of the unit. The unit can be either free or locked. The variable step is used to record the number of steps it has used to make transition to a new operational state since the transition is usually a multi-step process. One of the interesting properties is br, which specifies the two configurations, nominal and redundant, represented as A and B in the model of the unit. This property is further illustrated in module branches, which uses the module branch t to fully define the properties of each configuration of the unit. The functions manipulating the properties of units are modeled in detail as described in Section 3.1.2 below.
Modeling Ada Code
The overall structure of the Ada code is an infinite loop in which the four managers, AOCS manager, FDIR manager, Mode manager and Unit manager, are executed in sequence. All the actual functions and procedures defined in the Ada source code implementation are modeled as state labels in the NuSMV 2 model. The modeling of source code generally mimics the implementation. At this point, the translation is not yet done automatically. The core of this manual modeling is to treat each function entry point in the implementation as a potential program counter value and encode each function invocation as a single time step of the model. A similar idea of constructing models from program code is presented in [BCG + 09] for C programs. Figure 3 presents an example on how the source code is manually mapped to a NuSMV 2 model. Figure 3 (a) is a part of the source code excerpted from the implementation with some irrelevant code removed. The working procedure of this sample code is quite straightforward. In procedure Execute Step, it checks whether the value of variable Trans.Target is Standby. If this condition holds, then it calls the procedure To StandbyMode. The latter procedure first checks the value of the variable Trans.
Step. If the value of this variable is 0, then it will be increased to 1. Figure 3 (b) is the corresponding model in NuSMV 2. It first defines the variables used in ECEASST the procedures. Note that it has defined an additional variable label that does not appear in the source code. Generally, this variable is used as a program counter to determine which procedure or function is being executed at present. Thus, label has the two procedure names, execute step and to standbymode, as its possible values. Next, these variables are initialized with initial values as shown by the init clause. Lastly, the next state transitions are defined for variables label and trans.step. These transitions in the model are exactly as those implemented in the source code. Variable label is used as an example to show how variable values are updated. In the case clause, it is first checked whether the current values of label and trans.target are execute step and standby, respectively. If this holds, the value of label is updated to to standbymode. Otherwise, the value is unchanged. Note that the possible transitions of variable trans.target are not presented here for the ease of explanation. Note also that the Ada code has no recursion which makes modeling simpler, as there is no need to explicitly model the stack of the program.
Timer Abstraction
Besides abstracting entire units as described in Sect. 3.1.1, we apply a form of data abstraction. Most of the data structures in the implementation are modeled as they are, however, some of them are abstracted in the model. For instance, there are several timers in AOCS. The timers are mainly used to trigger certain events to occur and to record the timeouts of events in the Ada code. In the implementation, timers are defined as an integer type. If these were directly modeled as they are, then the modeling would become very expensive to analyze using NuSMV 2 due to state explosion. Therefore, we conduct an abstraction [CBKK94] of these timers that removes unnecessary details with non-deterministic choice in a sound way: the abstract model has more behaviors than the concrete one. If we are able to prove an LTL property for the abstract model, it will also hold in the concrete one.
As a simple example, suppose there is a timer initialized with value 0. Under normal conditions, this timer is incremented by 1 every time a periodic timer interrupt occurs. The timer is reset to 0 when a reset command is issued. Assume that increasing the timer to 100 triggers a special event. We create an abstraction of this timer as a state machine diagram shown in Figure 4(a) . The value 100 of the timer is modeled as a separate state, while the values 0..99 and 101.. are collapsed into single abstract states, respectively. Especially note how non-determinism is used in state "0..99" when the increment operation occurs to either stay in the same state or to go to the state "100". Such a timer abstraction can, of course, result in spurious counterexamples. However, in our case study, no spurious counterexamples are observed.
The NuSMV 2 model code for this timer is shown in Figure 4 (b).
LTL Property Generation
The LTL properties that are used to check the constructed model are generated from the mode transition diagrams in the requirements document. In general, four state diagrams, normal mode transitions (Figure 1(a) ), mode transition error handling (Figure 1(b) ), attitude error handling and unit error handling, are used for the generation of LTL properties. The generation procedure of these LTL properties is automated from a tabular notation. The main steps are summarized below. First, the extended state machine diagrams with prioritized transitions are transformed manually to a tabular notation consisting of a priority list in which the possible mode transitions of each state are prioritized according to the specific mode. Next, a Python script is written which can read the priority list and generate the corresponding LTL properties from it. Mode "safe" is used below to demonstrate how its related LTL properties are automatically generated from the mode transition diagrams. First, there are three types of possible errors that can occur at a specific mode according to the previous description of the AOCS system. It might be possible that two or more errors are occurring at the same time. Thus, it is necessary to prioritize the possible errors as well as the normal mode transition so that the property can reflect the fact that the system is handling one type of mode transition at a time. According to the nature of the AOCS system, the priorities of possible state transitions are inferred as follows. The mode transition error will always have the highest priority. The priority of attitude error handling follows it. Unit error handling in turn follows the attitude error handling. Finally, normal mode transition has the lowest priority. In case of mode "safe", its state transition under the condition mode transition error can be found from Figure 1 (b) while its related transition in the context of normal mode transition is depicted in Figure 1(a) . Its mode transitions in case of attitude error and unit error are extracted from the related state diagrams and shown in Figure 5 (a) and (b), respectively. Note that in Figure 5 , the depicted mode transition diagrams are truncated in order to only highlight the modes involved in the transitions. The corresponding priority list of mode transitions can be constructed as shown in Table 1 . In the column "Priority" of Table 1 , smaller integer indicates a higher priority of the specific mode transition. The LTL properties related to a specific state can be generated automatically from the priority list composed in the former step. The core idea is to extract the information about current mode, guard and target mode from the list. All guards belonging to transitions of higher priorities than those of the current mode transition should be disallowed for a lower priority transition to be enabled. According to these, the following LTL formula is constructed as the template for the generation of all the properties.
G (mode = CURRENT MODE) ∧ ¬HIGHER PRIORITY GUARDS ∧ GUARD → X (mode = CURRENT MODE) U ((mode = TARGET MODE) ∨

POSSIBLE HIGHER PRIORITY TRANSITION)
(1)
In the above formula, variables CURRENT MODE, HIGHER PRIORITY GUARDS, GUARD
and TARGET MODE will be substituted by the concrete values extracted from the priority list. The variable POSSIBLE HIGHER PRIORITY TRANSITION at the end of the template formula is needed for correct translation of mode transitions that are multi-step processes instead of atomic steps, as indicated in the column "Atomic" in Table 1 . When we ran an earlier version of the experiments, we noticed an anomaly with some property that had an unexpected counterexample. We managed to trace this counterexample back to a mismatch of the levels of atomicity between the mode transition diagrams and the Ada code implementation of the system. Namely, in the Ada implementation some of the state transitions are not atomic, and a lower priority mode transition needs to be aborted by the enabling of a higher priority transition "half-way through" a multi-step mode transition from one mode to the next. Such a mismatch between the specification and the implementation level of atomicity can possibly lead to subtle interpretations of the required behavior of the system, and our formal model checking was able to point such a case to us. The addition of POSSIBLE HIGHER PRIORITY TRANSITION enables correct handling of aborted transitions.
As an example, the concrete LTL formulas generated from Table 1 are listed as follows.
Note that in formulas (3) and (4), the mode transition from Safe to Off is atomic according to the implementation. Thus, no additional higher priority transition needs to be added. By contrast, in formula (5), the mode transition from Safe to Nominal is a multi-step process in the implementation. The possible higher priority transitions, therefore, must be considered for the purpose of aborting handling. It can be easily shown that these LTL formulas can be extended to related CTL formulas by simply adding the universal path quantifier A. Since CTL formulas are also checked in the following experiments, formula (2) is used as an example to show how CTL formula (6) can be obtained from the corresponding LTL formula.
Experimental Results
The experiment is carried out in a computing cluster environment with some background load. Each compute node in the cluster has two 6-core AMD Opteron 2345 CPUs and the memory ECEASST is 32 GB (about 2.5 GB per core). The cluster has in all 112 compute nodes. We use NuSMV 2.5.2 to model and verify the AOCS system. The code of the AOCS system is about 2200 lines of Ada while the NuSMV 2 model code is about 800 lines with only the unit PLI fully modeled. The model has roughly 80 variables and 25 state labels. The model currently has in total 2 124.483 states, out of which 84.5 million states are reachable. BDD-based LTL model checking is used in NuSMV 2 to check whether the generated LTL formulas hold or not. In addition, bounded model checking (BMC) is also used to find possible counterexamples. BMC is based on the reduction of the bounded model checking problem to a propositional satisfiability problem. NuSMV 2 internally invokes a propositional SAT solver to search for an assignment that satisfies the generated problem. In this experiment setup, NuSMV 2 is compiled to link to MiniSat [ES03] , a high performance and open-source SAT solver. Specifically, the incremental BMC algorithm (check ltlspec sbmc inc) [BHJ + 06, ES03] is used in NuSMV 2 to check the generated LTL specifications. Since NuSMV's default BMC is incomplete, we also tried to supply the command line option -c that performs the completeness check [BHJ + 06]. To obtain better performance results for BDD-based model checking, the value of the environment variable partition method is configured as Iwls95CP instead of the default one. In general, this method is conjunctive partitioning with clusters generated and ordered according to the heuristic introduced in [RAB + 95] .
In this experiment, there are 28 LTL properties generated from the mode transition diagrams in the system according to the generation method previously described. In all the cases, the time bound set to check each LTL property is configured to be 30 minutes. The purpose is to make the checking time long enough so that it can go deeper into the state space and find possible counterexamples. CTL model checking is also carried out with the generated CTL properties as demonstrated in Subsection 3.2. In general, the CTL model checking can deliver almost the same amount of conclusive results as LTL model checking does. The used time, however, is about an order of magnitude slower than that of LTL model checking. For the BMC part, a very large integer is supplied as the bound, so that the check will only terminate when a timeout or memory out is reached, or when a counterexample is found. The experimental results are summarized in Table 2 . The 28 properties are listed as P1 to P28 in the table.
In Table 2 , the column "BDD LTL" indicates the results using the NuSMV 2 BDD-based LTL model checking algorithm. T indicates that the property holds while F means that the property does not hold. The number after the forward slash is the time used by the checking and it is measured in seconds. T.O. means that the check exceeds the configured time bound. The column "BMC incomplete" represents the results using the incremental BMC algorithm while its neighbor "BMC complete" indicates the results using the same command but with command line option -c enabled so that it will perform the completeness check which also tries to prove the property holds. M.O. indicates that the check exceeds the memory limit. For P4', the numbers after the forward slash in these two columns indicate the time to find counterexamples. The number in the parenthesis is the step at which timeout, memory out is reached or a counterexample is found. For instance, the "BMC incomplete" column of property P1 states that the check is timed out at step 158. This means that there is no counterexample against P1 in 158 time steps. The table, as a whole, shows that the BMC without completeness check can reach larger bounds than its complete variant. Let us study in detail the property P4, which has the LTL representation
The formula contains the condition POSSIBLE HIGHER PRIORITY TRANSITION, as discussed in Section 3.2 above, to enable aborting the multi-step transition by a higher-priority transition. A previous version of the property, denoted by P4' in Table 2 , has the LTL representation
and omits the possibility of aborting the transition. As seen from the table, using P4' results in a false negative model checking result.
Conclusions
The AOCS system is a typical instance of a mission-critical system with various mode transitions triggered by inputs from a highly non-deterministic environment, including recovering from components faults. We have described how a symbolic model checker input language can be used to model an implementation of the AOCS system given its implementation in Ada source code. One of the key methods employed has been abstraction which can control the state space of ECEASST the model to a reasonable size. We have described techniques and abstractions used to alleviate the state explosion problem due to handling of timers and the large number of system components controlled by AOCS. The LTL properties used to check the model are generated based on mode transition diagrams of the system and the generation procedure is automated from a tabular notation. Even after the abstractions, the AOCS system is currently too large to be fully automatically verified using symbolic model checking methods. Instead of getting rid of the close one-to-one correspondence of the Ada source code and the corresponding NuSMV 2 model, and thus making the model state space more manageable, we have instead resorted to incomplete model checking methods, bounded model checking in particular. This leaves us with challenging problems for the symbolic model checker development work that we are also concurrently doing in other projects.
In the experiments, the BDD-based LTL model checking can deliver results to about half of all the checked properties while for the other properties the approach times out. The incremental BMC algorithm is mainly used for bug hunting but it does also show the non-existence of short counterexamples to the remaining properties. A timed out BDD-based LTL model checking run, however, does not provide any additional information of the property. Out of curiosity, we also ran the complete BMC algorithm, which tries to also prove properties correct, not only look for counterexamples. Similar to our previous experiences, the complete BMC algorithm is not able to prove properties correct for models of significant size.
We were also able to collect some comments about the model checking results from Space Systems Finland. In general, they think that using the BDD-based LTL model checking to prove 12 out of 28 properties in the experiment is acceptable from the industrial perspective. On the other hand, since BMC always goes beyond 100 steps in the experiment, it would increase their confidence if there would be a better explanation on what this means in the context of the system. That is, the BMC part might be understood better if the BMC experimental results could be quantified in some systematic way. For example, one could be looking at structural coverage of the model in 100 time steps or looking at scenarios that can or cannot happen in this bound. This opens up interesting topics for further study.
There are many additional topics for further work. Firstly, the modeling from Ada source code to NuSMV 2 models is currently manual work. If this part was automated, a lot of optimizations that are easy to do automatically would become available. The Ada code is sequential, and as only the system mode changes are observed from the outside, many of the internal states could potentially be automatically removed by an optimizing "model compiler". However, doing such optimizations manually is currently too time consuming and risky (it is easy to make modeling errors when "hand optimizing the model").
On the BMC side, the parallel and distributed BMC engine of [WNH09] could be used to go deeper into the system state space by exploiting multiple multi-core computers running on a single BMC instance in parallel. While the properties we check are not strictly safety properties (some of the counterexamples could be infinite loops where e.g., the mode does not change at all), they still have some counterexamples that can be represented by finite paths (e.g., the mode entered next is a wrong one). For these latter "safety" counterexamples, the approach of [LHJ10] can be used, which is tailored to more efficiently finding the safety counterexamples of PSL (superset of LTL) properties using BDD-based engines.
